Protective action decision making and the Oroville Dam incident by Wegner, Maria
   PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING AND 
THE OROVILLE DAM INCIDENT 
 
 
   By 
      MARIA WEGNER 
   Bachelor of Arts/Science in Environmental Policy  
   The University of Tulsa 
   Tulsa, Oklahoma 
   2001 
 
   Master of Science in Environmental Science  
   Oklahoma State University 
   Stillwater, Oklahoma 
   2009 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
   December, 2019
ii 
 
   PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING AND 
THE OROVILLE DAM INCIDENT 
 
 
   Dissertation Approved: 
 
   Dr. Tristan Wu 
  Dissertation Adviser 
   Dr. Haley Murphy 
 
   Dr. Ray Chang 
 
   Dr. Tony Wells 
 
iii 
The dedication and acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by 
committee members or Oklahoma State University. 
DEDICATION 
 
To my son, Amari – A kind gentleman once told me you would become someone asking the 
questions we have not even yet imagined.  I believe him.  Explore the world around you, travel, 
engage with new people and new ideas.  Ask and seek answers to the hard questions, the ones my 




I am convinced no one succeeds without the help of people along the way, and I am no different.  
I am deeply indebted to Dr. Tristan Wu, my advisor and mentor, for his patience and persistence 
in guiding me to completion.  I am grateful to have learned from you and for your unwavering 
support.   
 
I also wish to thank my committee members: Dr. Haley Murphy, who believed in me even when I 
was not sure I believed in myself; Dr. Tony Wells for your attention to detail; and Dr. Ray Chang, 
for his commitment to my completion.  I am also thankful to Dr. Dave Neal, Dr. Brenda Phillips, 
and Dr. Will Focht for their early guidance in the Fire and Emergency Management Program. 
 
I am deeply indebted to Drs. Dennis Mileti and John Sorensen for sparking my interest in this 
topic in 2014 and allowing use of the data for this dissertation.  I left the meeting in Davis 
inspired.  This dissertation would not have been possible without you.   
 
To my many classmates—you challenged my thinking and sharpened my mind.  I would not be 
where I am without each of you.  A special thank you to my cohort partners, Dr. Alyssa Provincio 
and Patrick Allen, and Dr. Trish McIntosh, Jim Aleski, and Dr. Carol Hackerott for their 
friendship and support.   
 
I am also grateful for the support of my colleagues at the United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
especially Joe Redican for allowing me the time off I needed to finish this dissertation; Sue 
Hughes for encouraging me to pursue my education while working; Tammy Conforti for 
checking in on me and her friendship through the years; Eric Halpin and Jason Needham for 
recognizing the need for an improved understanding of human behavior; and my policy partners 
in crime, Amy Frantz and Mindy Simmons, who were relentless encouragement and never-ending 
support.  Also, I am indebted to Katie Noland for proofreading my dissertation. 
 
Thank you to the many members of my family who helped me along the way, those who cared 
for Amari and especially to my husband, Brian.  You were right.  I am glad I am done instead of 
wishing I had started. 
 
To those not named, you are not forgotten. Thank you. 
iv 
 
Name: MARIA WEGNER   
 
Date of Degree: DECEMBER, 2019 
  
Title of Study: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING AND THE OROVILLE 
DAM INCIDENT 
 
Major Field: FIRE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
 
Abstract: Water resources infrastructure, including dams, provide significant benefits to 
the United States, but infrastructure also come with risks.  Managing infrastructure risk 
requires an understanding of evacuation decision making including, how and when 
people evacuate, and what factors contribute and influence decisions to evacuate.  
Research to date primarily focuses on hurricane evacuation decision making.  This study 
seeks to identify the factors that best explain warning diffusion, protective action 
initiation delay time, and protective action initiation and what people did during 
protective action delay time using data collected after the Oroville Dam incident in 2017.  
A time phased model of protective action decision making was applied to the study 
sample, which included two at-risk populations downstream of Oroville Dam: Population 
A, which includes households in Butte County, and Population B, which includes 
households in Sutter and Yuba Counties.  The study found that distance from the dam 
was a factor in believing the spillway would break and their town and home would flood 
in Population A.  Most demographic characteristics did not reflect decision making.  
However, income predicted warning receipt time and protective action initiation time in 
Population B.  Income, as well as risk belief, risk perception, decision-making, distance, 
and warning receipt time predicted evacuation in Population A. Race, message 
believability, and decision-making predicted evacuation in Population B. In both 
Population A and Population B warning receipt time predicted protective action initiation 
time, which suggests that delays in issuing warning and warning diffusion rates delay 
evacuation.  Message believability also predicted protective action initiation time in 
Population B.  In Populations A and B, people sought additional information using a cell 
phone call; the primary sources for information were friends, relatives, neighbors, and co-
workers.  Both populations took time to pack items to take with prior to evacuating.  The 
findings of this study will assist emergency managers, infrastructure managers, and 
government officials to better understand protective action decision making and improve 
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Infrastructure, including dams, play an important role in water resource development, including 
municipal and industrial water supply, recreation, and storing flood waters; however, in the 
process of altering floodplains to serve other needs, risks are introduced or transformed such as is 
the case with dams.  When risks are transformed, human risk perception and subsequent behavior 
also change, impacting how and when individuals take protective action, such as moving out of 
harm’s way, in the face of a dam incident. 
Estimating the time necessary to evacuate a population, should a dam incident occur, relies on 
understanding the human decisions that lead to evacuation.  The Protective Action Decision 
Model (PADM) provides a way to organize human behavior and decision-making research 
(Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  However, the PADM does not estimate the time it takes 
to decide to take protective action.  The Time Phased Model of Warning and Response measures 
key periods of time in warning and response (Sorensen & Mileti, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2018; 
Urbanik, 2000; Urbanik, Desrosiers, Lindell, & Schuller, 1980).  Evacuation away from a hazard 
consists of four time periods: hazard identification, warning issuance delay, warning diffusion, 
and protective action initiation (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Sorensen & Mileti, 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c, 2018; Urbanik, 2000; Urbanik et al., 1980).  The estimates for each time period inform life 
loss estimates (Jonkman, 2007, 2016; Jonkman & Kelman, 2005; Kolen, 2016; Mauro, Bruijn, & 
Meloni, 2012; Needham, Fields, & Lehman, 2016). 
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United States government agencies calculate estimated life loss using flood characteristics, 
warning and evacuation time periods, and protective action success during evacuation.  The 
information informs multimillion-dollar actions to manage risks associated with dams (Feinberg, 
Engemoen, Fiedler, & Osmun, 2016; United States Corps of Engineers [USACE], 2014).  The 
underlying premise in the use of life loss estimates is to avoid increasing the fatalities rates of the 
population due to risks associated with infrastructure, or stated another way, to avoid 
infrastructure posing an intolerable risk on the population.  This is not to say that infrastructure 
cannot or will not fail or pose a hazard itself, but that to the extent possible, the owner-operator 
needs to try to avoid and manage risks imposed on the population by the infrastructure.  
This study seeks to identify the factors that best explain warning diffusion, protective action 
initiation delay time, and protective action initiation and what people do during protective action 
delay time.  Anticipating human behavior can help save people’s lives during flood events, 
including those resulting from dam failure.  Improved understanding of decision making will 
allow dam owner and operators, emergency managers, and other officials responsible for 
evacuations use their understanding of evacuation behaviors to perform better advanced 
predictive modeling during risk assessments, improve emergency exercises, and plan for the time 








This literature review begins by placing dams in a risk context, including introducing the Oroville 
Dam incident.  Then, it will examine the literature of the Time Phased Model of Warning and 
Response (Sorensen & Mileti, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2018; Urbanik et al., 1980) and the 
Protective Action Decision Model (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  The last section 
discusses evacuation studies.  Finally, the research questions and hypothesis for this study are 
introduced.    
2.1 Dam Risks 
Federal agencies, such as the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Bureau of 
Reclamation (BOR), utilize estimates of life loss as a part of their understanding of the risks an 
existing dam poses to the public.  The estimates are used to evaluate and compare the benefits of 
structural modifications and nonstructural alternatives, such as evacuation, to manage the risks 
associated with the dam (DeKay & McClelland, 1993).  Multiple definitions of risk exist; 
however, risk generally is defined as the function of the probability of some event occurring and 
the consequence of that event (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; Jaeger, 2001; Jonkman, 2007; 
Mauro et al., 2012; Slovic, 2003; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Tierney, 2014).  Some 
definitions also incorporate uncertainty.  For the purposes of this paper, risk is “a situation or 
event in which something of human value (including humans themselves) have been put at stake 
and where the outcome is uncertain” (Jaeger, 2001, p. 17).  Risk analysis provides a systemic  
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way to apply theories and methods from a variety of disciplines for the “purpose of collecting and 
interpreting data and drawing conclusions about” hazards (Stern & Fineberg, 1996, p. 214).   
Evaluating risks posed by infrastructure, including dams, requires that the situation or event that 
could cause harm include both the hazard agent (flood) and performance of infrastructure.  Flood 
risk often times includes performance of the infrastructure; however, considering performance 
separately reduces the biased assumption of perfect performance when weaknesses in and 
between systems are known (Cutter et al., 2013).  In other words, dams store water in a reservoir 
behind the structure, and a dam failure on an otherwise ‘sunny day’ or during a rain event can 
result in harm to something of human value.  Dam failure is characterized by the “set of events 
leading to sudden, rapid, and uncontrolled release of the reservoir impoundment” (USACE, 2014, 
p. 18-2).  Significant uncertainty underlies dam incidents (Cox Jr, 2012).  While dam safety 
professionals perform Potential Failure Mode Analysis (PFMA) and some subsequently make 
estimates of the risks associated with dam failure (Feinberg et al., 2016; USACE, 2014), the 
timing of when a failure, or near failure, will occur and magnitude of the consequences remains 
unknown and uncertain until the event occurs (Kasperson, 2009; Paté-Cornell, 1996; Paté-
Cornell, 2002; Sorensen & Mileti, 1987). 
Federal policy defines the components of flood risk as hazard; performance; exposure of people, 
property, and the environment; vulnerability of the exposed population, property, and the 
environment; and consequence or magnitude of harm (USACE, 2014).  Flood hazard is the 
recognition of the water as a source of danger, such as the physical loading or water levels on the 
dam.  Performance refers to how infrastructure systems react when stressed by the hazard, such as 
the probability of a dam failing prior or subsequent to water flowing over the top of the dam.  
Hazard exposure refers to who or what might be harmed, generally people, property, and the 
environment (USACE, 2014).  Vulnerability refers to how susceptible the exposed people, 
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property, and environment are to harm (Dennis S Mileti & Sorensen, 1990).  The magnitude of 
harm to the exposed people, infrastructure, and environment makes up the consequence. 
While detection of a hazard or nonperformance of infrastructure often is the result of direct 
observation, an individual downstream of a dam usually will not directly observe a dam incident 
and know to take protective action.  Most warnings will come from emergency mangers or other 
officials responsible for issuing warnings to the public (Drabek, 2013).  In part this is because 
dam incidents can occur during sunny or rainy-day events.  For example, Teton Dam failed on a 
sunny June day (Independent Panel to Review Cause of Teton Dam, 1976).  Even though there 
are case studies and investigations that focus on dam failure mechanisms, warning downstream 
populations, and life loss (Becker et al., 2007; Foster, Fell, & Spannagle, 2000; Graham, 2009; 
Independent Panel to Review Cause of Teton Dam, 1976; Sherard, 1987), few studies exists on 
how, when, and what factors influence taking protective action by populations downstream of 
dams. 
2.1.1 Oroville Facility 
The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) owns and operates the California State 
Water Project (SWP) (California Department of Water Resources, 2019).  Within DWR, the 
Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) operates all 22 dams associated with the SWP, and 11 of the 
dams are also regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (France et al., 
2018).  Oroville is a part of the SWP and regulated by FERC (France et al., 2018).  
Oroville dam is a 770-foot-tall, earthen embankment, high hazard dam located on the Feather 
River in Butte County, California. The Oroville facility “consists of an embankment dam, the 
Oroville Flood Control Outlet, Oroville emergency spillway, Hyatt Powerplant, River Value 
Outlet System, and the Palermo Tunnel and Outlet” (see Figure 1) (France et al., 2018, pp. 7-8).  
According to the U.S. Society on Dams, Oroville is the tallest dam in the United States and 
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construction was completed in 1968.  The facility and its reservoir serve multiple purposes.  In 
addition to flood risk reduction, the facility provides water conservation, power generation, 
recreation, and fish and wildlife management (France et al., 2018). 
Figure 1. Oroville Dam Facility (prior to February 2017 incident) 
Source: The Independent Forensic Team Report, January 2018 
Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA) provides dam safety professionals one way to identify 
the ways in which a dam might fail, and PFMAs were conducted on Oroville Dam in 2004, 2009, 
and 2014 (France et al., 2018).  The spillway failure mode was only identified in the 2014 PFMA, 
but it was not judged to cause uncontrolled release of the reservoir and downstream flooding 
(France et al., 2018).  
  
 Section 3 – Background 
Independent Forensic Team Report,  Page 8 January 2018 
Oroville Dam Spillway Incident   
is the tallest dam in the United States at 770 feet. The design embankment crest is at Elevation 
9223, and the maximum normal operating pool level is Elevation 900. For reference, the service 
spillway gate sill is at Elevation 813.6, and the crest of the emergency spillway overflow structure 
is at Elevation 901.  
 
Figure 3-1: Overview of Oroville Dam facility prior to the February 2017 incident 
The Oroville Dam service spillway, in particular the service spillway chute, and the Oroville Dam 
emergency spillway are the structures of interest in this investigation. Both spillways are described 
in Section 3.2 below. 
  
                                                 
3 All elevations are reported in feet according the datum used on drawings and in DWR records. 
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2.1.2 Summary of the Oroville Dam Incident 
The recent spillway incident at Oroville Dam provides an opportunity to study human protective 
action behaviors as a result of a near miss dam failure incident (J. H. Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  
California experienced a very wet winter in 2016-2017 (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The 
Independent Forensics Team Report describes in significant detail the flows experienced by the 
service spillway in January and February 2017, which were the first significant flows since 2011 
(France et al., 2018).  From February 6-10, nearly 13 inches fell on the Feather River Basin 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).   
On February 7, onsite DWR personnel noticed a disturbance in the service spillway chute flow 
(France et al., 2018), which lead to closing of the service spillway gates, and the observance of 
slabs missing from the service spillway chute.  The Butte County Sheriff was notified; however, 
the Sheriff learned of the hole in the spillway chute through social media (Sorensen & Mileti, 
2018).  DWR and the Sheriff informed the public using social media while DWR, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), and other dam safety agencies consulted and the service 
spillway was monitored (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  After examining the damage, DWR operated 
the service spillway in order to “test service spillway capabilities in the damaged condition” 
(France et al., 2018, p. 25).  Sorensen and Mileti (2018) report that Butte County Sheriff issued 
public information bulletins to the at-risk population downstream on February 9th and 11th.   
On February 11th, water began flowing over the emergency spillway in order to minimize the 
spillway erosion (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The emergency spillway flows channelized across 
the natural terrain, causing erosion and head cutting towards the emergency spillway crest 
structure causing DWR to open the service spillway gates more and issue an evacuation order 
downstream (France et al., 2018).  DWR was managing the flows with a damaged spillway and 
head cutting of the emergency spillway, while trying to keep tailwater from the spillway 
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discharges out of the Hyatt Powerplant, and without having the spillway erosion cause failure of a 
power transmission tower to the right of the service spillway chute (France et al., 2018).  It was 
critical to avoid losing the power plant and transmission lines in order to continue to adjust the 
releases from the dam.   
On February 12th at approximately 3:50 PM, the Butte County Sheriff decided it was time to 
evacuate the population downstream of Oroville Dam, and the Sherriff notified the Sheriffs of 
Yuba and Sutter Counties that he was evacuating the at-risk population in Butte County and 
advised them to do the same (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  DWR began distributing the evacuation 
message to safety and emergency managers at 4:10 PM (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The Butte 
County Sheriff issued the first public evacuation message at 4:21 PM, and the National Weather 
Service issued a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) to all three counties at risk at 4:35 PM 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  Additional targeted messages were issued by various warning 
officials in Yuba County, Sutter County, Yuba City between 5:33 PM and 6:49 PM (Sorensen & 
Mileti, 2018).   
Flow over the emergency spillway stopped on February 12th at approximately 8:00 PM and on 
February 14th around 3:30 PM, the evacuation order was downgraded to an evacuation warning 
(France et al., 2018). The service spillway remained in operation until February 27 in order to 
reach the target reservoir level (France et al., 2018).  In early to mid-March, the evacuation 
warning was lifted (France et al., 2018).   
2.2 Time Phased Model of Warning and Response 
As is the case in nearly all risk scenarios, decisions to warn the public and for the public to take 
protective actions are made under conditions of uncertainty.  Sorensen and Mileti (2014a, 2014b, 
2014c, 2018) utilized other hazard types to develop warning issuance delay time, warning 
diffusion time, and protective action initiation delay times.  Figure 2 illustrates the time periods 
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used by Sorensen and Mileti (2018), which builds on the four time periods of Urbanik et al. 
(1980): decision time, notification time, preparation time, and response time (Urbanik, 2000; 
Urbanik et al., 1980).  However, understanding of what happens within each time frame continue 
to improve, as does the understanding of factors influencing the time frames.   
 
Figure 2. Time Phased Model of Warning and Response 
Source: John H. Sorensen & Mileti, 2018 
2.2.1 Warning Issuance Delay 
Warning issuance delay time is defined as “the period between the point when some form of 
notification concerning a threat is received by a warning issuance organization and the point that 
a decision is made to issue warning” (Sorensen & Mileti, 2014a, p. 1).  Sorensen and Mileti 
(2018) revised their conceptualization of warning issuance delay to distinguish between the time 
between the hazard notification and the decision to warn, and then the time for the message to 
move through the warning distribution system.  Past literature combines those time frames into 




























behalf of an organization or an organization, must reach a decision to issue a warning.  The 
general sequence of issuing a protective action warning follows a similar pattern across 
researchers (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Perry & Lindell, 2006; Rogers, 1994; Sorensen & Mileti, 
1987).  Key organizational decision points include the detection of a hazard, determination that 
the hazard presents a threat, the decision to alert, inter-organizational response, determination of 
protective action, and public response (Sorensen & Mileti, 1987).  Warning issuance delay 
frequently is not recorded and little research exists to understand the process by which this delay 
occurs. 
Communication within and between organizations presents uncertainty in the information 
presented, as does lack of clarity regarding whom to notify, how to describe the hazard, and how 
to deal with conflicting information (Sorensen & Mileti, 1987).  Some preparedness plans, 
especially those involving infrastructure, define trigger points for when a protective action 
warning would be initiated (Gruntfest & Huber, 1989; Sene, 2010).  The trigger points allow for 
anyone to issue the warning, not just an emergency manager or other warning official(s) and takes 
the uncertainty of understanding the potential impacts to the population away from a person’s risk 
perception and in to a defined trigger event.   
Risk assessments provide valuable information for technically oriented professionals; however, 
the information must be deliberated upon to inform decisions to issue or heed warning messages 
by individuals sometimes lacking the technical background that aids with contextualizing risk 
assessments (Stern et al., 1996).  The capacity of an organization or warning official to give and 
receive information and the uncertainty surrounding that capacity influences warning issuance 
delay.  For example, in the October 1999 landslide dam failure in Poerua River, Westland New 
Zealand, Becker et al. (2007) found that communication and understanding challenges between 
the scientific advisor and the Westland District Council may have resulted in delayed evacuation 
warning.   
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While most research centers on the risk perception of the people receiving a message of potential 
harm, warning officials must also perceive harm prior to ordering evacuation warnings and use 
that perception to inform warning action; this should not be overlooked for its value to 
understanding the thought process of the warning official.  Even technically oriented people apply 
a lens through which the risk is perceived, rendering risk a social construct with multiple 
interpretations of the same information (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Jasanoff, 1998; Lindell, Tierney, 
& Perry, 2001).  The warning official must perceive a risk to a population in order to consider 
issuing a protective action warning. 
2.2.2 Warning Diffusion Time 
Warning diffusion is the amount of time it takes from a warning message being issued to when 
warning is received by the at-risk population (Sorensen & Mileti, 2014b).  Warning receipt is 
predicated on receiving the alert or warning from formal, informal, or unofficial sources 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018). Warning may occur prior to the decision to warn due to 
environmental or social cues, or informal or unofficial warning (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 
2012; Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  An example of informal warning is a call or text message from 
a friend or neighbor, and unofficial sources include news media warning of the possibility of an 
incident or evacuation order (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  Warning receipt is influenced by where 
people are located and what they are doing (Rogers & Sorensen, 1988) as well as the method used 
to transmit warning (Lindell & Perry, 1987; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Rogers & Sorensen, 1988).   
Some people are more likely to hear warnings because of their social network, or because their 
social role connects them to informal warnings (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990).  People of high 
socioeconomic status are more likely to hear a warning (Sorensen, 1991).  Sorensen (1991) found 
that those who lived nearer to the hazard site receive warning earlier than those farther away. 
Some people may not hear or notice the warning due to “habituation (e.g., they never really listen 
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to television), selective perception (e.g., they hear only what they want to), or physical contains 
(e.g., they are out of range of the siren system)” (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990b, p. 5-1). Inaccurately 
recalling the first warning received is also a factor (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012; 
Sorensen & Mileti, 2018; Wu, Lindell, & Prater, 2015) 
2.2.3 Protective Action Delay Time 
Protective action initiation delay time is the time it takes for a person or household to receive 
warning, until they initiate protective action (Sorensen & Mileti, 2014c).  Mileti and Sorensen 
(1990) describe the warning response process of hearing, understanding, believing, personalizing, 
deciding, and searching and confirming as an ordered-choice process, even if it is not linear for 
everyone. Reunification of the household can also occur during this time period (Mileti & 
Sorensen, 1990).  Understanding the message, believing it, personalizing it, and deciding to act 
are influenced by the characteristics of the warning message.  Specificity of the message, 
including the actions to take, urgency, and risk characteristics, increases the effectiveness of the 
warning (Dennis S Mileti & Sorensen, 1990). 
2.3 Protective Action Decision Model 
Evacuation research can be understood using the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM, 
Figure 3), which lays out the environmental context, personal characteristics, situational 
facilitators and impediments, and behavioral response processes that affect decisions to take 
protective action upon receipt of warning ( Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  While the 
PADM lays out a usual pattern, not all persons undertake all steps, nor do the decisions occur in 




Figure 3. Information flow in the PADM  
Source: Lindell (2018) 
2.3.1 Social and Environmental Context 
The environmental context of decision making includes physical, social, and household 
components (Lindell, Huang, Wei, & Samuelson, 2016).  Physical components include the 
characteristics of the hazard agent, as well as structures available that could protect or threaten 
one’s safety.  For dam incidents, and flooding in general, the protective action necessary varies 
based on the depth, duration, velocity, and temperature of flood waters.  High velocity floods of 
sufficient depth can move homes off of their foundation, so vertical evacuation might not be 
successful.  Whereas, shallow, low velocity flooding can allow for a person to safely shelter in 
their home.  The social component includes those who can help or inform others, or those who 
may need assistance (Lindell, 2018).  Household component includes the presence or absence of 
household members (Lindell, 2018).  Separated household members seek information regarding 
those missing, delaying evacuation until they are reunited or agree where to meet (Drabek & 
Boggs, 1968).   
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Within the environmental context, environmental cues, social cues, information sources, 
information channels, and warning messages are the early components in the evacuation decision-
making process (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  While some people evacuate due to 
informal or unofficial warnings, government issued warnings facilitate evacuation for many 
people (Drabek, 2013).  The general sequence of issuing a protective action warning follows a 
similar pattern across researchers (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Perry & Lindell, 2006; Rogers, 1994; 
Sorensen & Mileti, 1987):  first, the hazard must be made known by those whom have observed 
the hazard through monitoring or by chance; monitoring of the threat occurs, and then the threat 
is assessed and projections of likely consequences made; finally, the decision to warn (or not) is 
made and risk communication occurs. 
2.3.2 Psychological Processes 
The information received within the social/environmental context, then undergoes a psychologic 
process.  Three activities make up the psychological processes—pre-decisional processes; core 
perceptions (threat perceptions, protective action perceptions, and stakeholder perceptions); and 
protective action decision making (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  Lindell and Perry 
(2012) identify the psychological processes one undergoes to take protective action (p. 618-619). 
The pre-decision processes, which include exposure, attention, and comprehension, primarily 
occur subconsciously (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Wu et al., 2015).  Whether the result of 
environmental or social cues, people will not initiate protective action “unless people receive, 
heed, and comprehend” the information transmitted (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619).  
Core perceptions are the basic frame from which people intake, analyze, and assign meaning to 
information received, including risk information.  Most people “rely on intuitive risk judgments, 
typically called ‘risk perceptions’ when assessing risks (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 1977).  Risk 
perception includes considering the likelihood that an individual will personally experience a 
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consequence (Lindell & Perry, 2012).  Even technically oriented people apply a lens through 
which the risk is perceived, rendering risk a social construct with multiple interpretations of the 
same information (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Jasanoff, 1998; Lindell et al., 2001).   
Dash and Gladwin (2007) identify risk perceptions as a key factor in evacuation decision making. 
However, risk perception does not always lead to a quicker response (Sorensen, 1991).  Risk 
perception is influenced by the perceived knowledge, trustworthiness, and protective action 
responsibility of the government and individuals (Arlikatti, Lindell, & Prater, 2007; Lindell, 
Arlikatti, & Prater, 2009; Murphy, Greer, & Wu, 2018).  Experience with a hazard can also 
change how risk is perceived and increase a person’s willingness to consider and take protective 
action (Greer, Wu, & Murphy, 2018).  In addition, Wu et al. (2015) found that participants sought 
information from an authoritative source to explain risk information. 
Once people perceive the risk, they identify and evaluate protective actions prior to choosing to 
act or not (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  Protective actions can be characterized as 
hazard related attributes (protecting people and property) and resource related attributes (cost, 
time, effort, knowledge, and skills) (Lindell, 2018; Lindell et al., 2009; Lindell & Perry, 2012).  
Lindell et al. (2009) found that hazard adjustment attributes (protecting people and property) are 
judged on more than benefits and economic costs. Risk perception influences the intent to take 
protective action (Wu, Greer, Murphy, & Chang, 2017).  However, perceiving risk does not 
always result in taking protective action, even when there is agreement that preparing for an 
earthquake is beneficial (Whitney, Lindell, & Nguyen, 2004).   
Verification of the warning message, referred to as part of the “milling” process, is one of the 
activities that occurs during the time period between receiving a warning and taking protective 
action (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990a).  During this time, people verify warning messages, 
contemplate their personal consequences, and evaluate which protective actions to take (Drabek, 
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1999; Sorensen & Mileti, 1988; Urbanik et al., 1980).  Choices made often reflect past 
experiences, are made after validation and invitations to seek protective action, and are influenced 
by observing the choices of others (Drabek, 2013; Greer et al., 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).   
The psychologic process is influenced by the receiver’s personal characteristics, demographic 
attributes, past experience, and resources (Greer et al., 2018; Lindell, 2018).  Lindell (2018) 
indicates few demographic variables directly measure people’s resources; personal characteristics 
influence the psychologic processes in varied ways. Overall, the influence of demographic 
characteristics do not produce consistent patterns (Arlikatti et al., 2007; Lindell et al., 2009).  
While age is known to influence cognition within the PADM (Mayhorn, 2005), other 
demographic characteristics have not been studied 
2.3.3 Behavioral Response 
Once a decision is made to take protective action, implementation of that action remains.  People 
“frequently delay implementation until they have determined that the immediacy of the threat 
justifies the disruption of normal activities” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 623).  Some people intend 
to act but do not initiate that action (Lindell, 2018).  Response actions are influenced by the 
adequacy of the information provided.  When information shared about the threat or 
recommended protective action is insufficient and time is available, people seek additional 
information from other sources (Lindell, 2018).  Once the necessary information is available and 
questions answered, protective action implementation may occur (Lindell, 2018).  However, 
access to information does not necessitate action. 
Situational impediments and facilitators influence the implementation of behavioral response. 
Situational impediments typically override protective action initiation more so than unexpected 
facilitators (Lindell, 2018).  For example, the lack of access to a personal vehicle impedes 
evacuation even when one wants to evacuate (Wu, Lindell, & Prater, 2012). Similarly, road 
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capacity can limit evacuation of large urban areas (Kendra, Rozdilsky, & McEntire David, 2008).  
Research shows homeowners are more likely to evacuate, and there is evidence that education is 
an increasingly important indicator of predicting whether people choose to and are able to 
evacuate (Huang et al., 2016).   
2.4 Evacuation Studies 
While research on the mechanisms of dam incidents and failure is plentiful, evaluation of 
protective action decision making for dam failure events are limited.  As such, one must look to 
evacuation studies for other hazard types.  Most evacuation research focuses on when to evacuate 
(Sorensen, 1991; Sorensen & Mileti, 1988) and who does or does not evacuate (Dash & Gladwin, 
2007).  Quite a bit of attention has been given to hurricane evacuation (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; 
Dash & Morrow, 2000; Dow & Cutter, 2000, 2002; Huang et al., 2016; Whitehead, 2003; Wu et 
al., 2012; Wu et al., 2015).   
Horney, MacDonald, Willigen, Berke, and Kaufman (2010) found that although risk perception 
and flood risk are correlated, neither risk perception or actual flood risk were related to 
evacuation decision making in Hurricane Isabel.  However, in the Colorado floods of 2013, those 
who believed flooding would severely damage or destroy their property and those who believed 
the flood would injure or kill someone in their family were more likely to protect their property 
(Wu, Arlikatti, Prelog, & Wukich, 2017).  It is unknown if the distance or time to arrival impacts 
risk perception or protective action taking for dam incidents.   
Studies comparing the protective actions of populations of varying distance from dam incidents 
are also limited.  Most evacuation studies focus on the distance evacuees must travel to reach 
their destination (Dash & Morrow, 2000; Dow & Cutter, 2000, 2002; Whitehead, 2003; Wu et al., 
2012) and less on whether distance from the threat influences action.  In hurricane evacuation 
studies, distance from the coast is related to evacuation departure time indicating that those living 
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farther from the coast begin their evacuations later (Lindell, Kang, & Prater, 2011; O'Neill, 
Brereton, Shahumyan, & Clinch, 2016; Wu et al., 2012).  Lindell, Lu, and Prater (2005) also 
found proximity to the coast and inland waterways were important environmental cues in 
evacuating prior to Hurricane Lili; evacuation rates decreased relative to the predicted landfall 
point.  In a meta-analysis of hurricane evacuation studies, Huang et al. (2016) found that 
geographic proximity is a consistent predictor of hurricane evacuation. 
Sorensen (1991) found a weak relationship between the distance from the hazard site and the time 
period during which warning was received, with nearer populations receiving warning earlier 
than those farther away. However, mobilization was similar throughout the population regardless 
of distance from the hazard.  Mileti and Fitzpatrick (1992) studied the Parkfield earthquake using 
three communities that “were similar in size, and varied by earthquake experience and distance 
from the predicted quake’s epicenter” (p. 395). The key findings were the same across all three 
communities regardless of distance from the event (Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1992).  Maderthaner, 
Guttmann, Swaton, and Otway (1978) found that persons living nearer a nuclear reactor 
perceived the risks to be lower than those who lived farther away at .5 km and 1.4 km; however, 
the closest population rated the risk the same as those who lived on average 10 km away from the 
reactor.  Flood risk perception is lowest where floods occur frequently and infrequently, and 
highest where the flood frequency is in between (Burton, Kates, & White, 1968).  O'Neill et al. 
(2016) found that the distance to the perceived flood zone does impact flood risk perception. 
2.5 Summary 
This literature review began by placing dams in a risk context and examined the Time Phased 
Model of Warning and Response (Sorensen & Mileti, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2018; Urbanik et al., 
1980) and the Protective Action Decision Model (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012).   Finally, 
evacuation studies were discussed. 
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Improved understanding of protective action decision making, and the time it takes to receive 
warning, decide, and initiate evacuation can reduce damage to property and life loss.  It can also 
help dam owner and operators, emergency managers, and other officials responsible for 
evacuations to better understand evacuation behaviors, advance predictive modeling during risk 
assessments, and plan for the time necessary to initiate evacuation.  Existing studies attempt to 
quantify warning diffusion and protective action initiation delay times, but few studies attempt to 
explain and predict variation in those times based on socioeconomic or sociodemographic factors, 
or distance.  Little research exists on how these factors may influence protective action for events 
involving major infrastructure, such as dams. To address this issue, this study integrates the 
PADM (Lindell, 2018) and the Time Phased Model of Warning and Response (Sorensen & 
Mileti, 2018). The PADM variables will be used to test its association with warning diffusion, 
protective action initiation delay, and protective action initiation. A Time Phased Protective 
Action Decision Making Model was conceptualized and applied to data pertaining to evacuation 
behaviors during the 2017 Oroville event (Figure 4). Twenty (20) research questions were used to 
test four (4) research hypothesis about warning diffusion, and protective action initiation delay, 
and protective action initiation. 
 Warning Diffusion: 
(WQ1A) Which warning receiver sociodemographic characteristics predict warning receipt time 
in Population A1? 
(WQ1B) Which warning receiver sociodemographic characteristics predict warning receipt time 
in Population B? 
                                                             
 




(WH1A) People in Population A who live nearer to Oroville dam received warning before those 
farther away.   
(WH1B) People in Population B who live nearer to Oroville dam received warning before those 
farther away. 
Protective Action Initiation Delay 
Risk Perception 
(PQ1A) Do people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam perceive risk differently than 
people farther away? 
(PQ1B) Do people in Population B living nearer to Oroville Dam perceive risk differently than 
people farther away? 
(PQ2A) Do people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam understand the warning 
message differently than those farther away? 
(PQ2B) Do people in Population B living nearer to Oroville Dam understand the warning 
message differently than those farther away? 
(PQ3A) Do people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam believe the risks differently 
than those farther away? 
(PQ3B) Do people in Population B living nearer to Oroville Dam believe the risks differently 
than those farther away? 
(PQ4A) Do people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam report the evacuation message 
aided in decision making differently than those farther away? 
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(PQ4B) Do people in Population B living nearer to Oroville Dam report the evacuation message 
aided in decision making differently than those farther away? 
(PQ5A) What are the correlations among Population A’s message belief, risk belief, 
understanding, risk perception, and decision making? 
(PQ5B) What are the correlations among Population B’s message belief, risk belief, 
understanding, risk perception, and decision making? 
Pre-evacuation Behaviors 
(PQ6A) After first warning, how did Population A communicate with others? 
(PQ6B) After first warning, how did Population B communicate with others? 
(PQ7A) From where did Population A seek additional information? 
(PQ7B) From where did Population B seek additional information? 
(PQ8A) What actions did people in Population A take after being warned and before evacuation? 
(PQ8B) What actions did people in Population B take after being warned and before evacuation? 
Protective Action Initiation 
(EH1A) Message believability, risk belief, risk perception, understanding, decision making, 
distance, warning receipt time, and sociodemographic characteristics predict whether people in 
Population A evacuated. 
(EH1B) Message believability, risk belief, risk perception, understanding, decision making, 
distance, warning receipt time, and sociodemographic characteristics predict whether people in 
Population B evacuated. 
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(EQ1A) Do additional pre-evacuation messages, message believability, warning receipt time, risk 
belief, understanding, risk perception, decision making, distance, and socioeconomic 
considerations predict protective action initiation time in Population A? 
(EQ1B) Do additional pre-evacuation messages, message believability, warning receipt time, risk 
belief, understanding, risk perception, decision making, distance, and socioeconomic 






























































3.1 Data Collection 
This study makes use of the survey data that was collected by Drs. Sorensen and Mileti.  Drs. 
Sorensen and Mileti were under contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) to collect data on warning and evacuation related to the Oroville Dam incident 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The questionnaire was comprised of primarily closed ended (multiple 
choice and Likert scale) questions with opportunities to provide additional information for an 
“other” selection, as well as fill in the blank questions regarding time.  Drs. Sorensen and Mileti 
hired the Social Science Research Center (SSRC) at California State University Fullerton to 
collect and code data from the downstream population.  This study will make use of the 
downstream population survey data for Butte County (Population A) and Sutter and Yuba 
Counties (Population B).  The data is available upon request from the USACE. 
The primary purpose for the data collection was to “determine if new warning technologies 
available in the nation today require changes to the issuance, diffusion, and protective action 
initiation curves previously recommended to the USACE for use in dam and levee failure loss of 
life estimation models” (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018, p. 1).  However, in addition to the data on 
warning technologies, the questionnaire collected empirical data on the warning decision  
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process, timing of protective action implementation, and the ways in which people implemented 
protective action.  Sociodemographic information was also collected.   
3.2 Sample Selection and Method 
Two separate and distinct populations were surveyed – Population A comprised of Butte County 
closest to Oroville Dam, and Population B comprised of people from Sutter and Yuba County 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The sample was derived using addresses within block groups that 
were partially or completely in the study area (i.e. downstream of the Oroville dam); however, 
nearly 85% of the sample block groups had the entirety of the households within the study area 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  A total of 5,000 addresses were randomly selected for inclusion 
(2,500 for Population A and 2,500 for Population B) and mailed the questionnaire and cover letter 
with non-completers receiving a reminder postcard (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  Figure 5 
identifies the households selected by Drs. Sorensen and Mileti (2018) for inclusion in the sample. 
The completion rate for Population A (Butte County) was 17.4% with 435 people returning the 
survey and a sampling fraction of 1% (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018). The margin of error for the 
Population A sample is reported as ±2.32 points at the 95% confidence level (Sorensen & Mileti, 
2018).  The completion rate for Population B (Sutter and Yuba Counties) was 16% with 400 
people completing the survey (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The margin of error for the Population 
B sample is reported as ±2.45 points at the 95% confidence level, and the sampling fraction for 
Population B is 0.3% (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The different sampling fractions for Population 
A and Population B prevent combining the data for analysis in this study.  When the study sample 
was compared to the American Community Survey 5-year estimates from the 2012-2016 period, 
biases were detected in the sample with respect to race, income level, and level of education 
(Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).    
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Figure 5. Households selected for inclusion in the sampling frames 
Source: Sorensen and Mileti (2018) 
3.3 Measures 
Utilizing the data described collected by Sorensen and Mileti (2018), this study utilizes multiple 
variables to measure the factors that best explain warning diffusion, protective action initiation 
delay time, and protective action initiation.  The variables for this analysis include the personal 
characteristics collected in the survey (age, education, income, gender, ethnicity, occupation, 
role/responsibility), as well as distance, warning receipt time, message believability, risk belief, 
risk perception, information searching channel, information searching source, pre-evacuation 
actions, understanding, protective action initiation delay time, and protective action initiation.   
3.3.1 Variables 
Personal / Sociodemographic Characteristics.  The dataset includes self-reported information on 
gender (male, female, other), ethnicity (White, Hispanic or Latino, Black or African American, 
Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Other), 
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age (18-24 years, 25-34 years, 35-44 years, 45-54 years, 55-64 years, 65-74 years, 75 years and 
older), education (Less than High school diploma, High school diploma or equivalent, some 
college but no degree, Associate degree, Bachelor degree, Graduate degree), income (Less than 
$15,000, $15,000-$24,999, $25,000-$34,999, $35,000-$49,999, $50,000-$74,999, $75,000-
$99,999, $100,000-$149,999, $150,000-$199,999, $200,000 or more), occupation (employed 
(including self-employed), working 1-39 hours per week; employed (including self-employed), 
working 40 or more hours per week; not employed, looking for work; not employed, not looking 
for work; retired; disabled, not able to work; and stay at home mom/dad), and role/responsibility 
(children under age of 18, adults over the age of 18 and under the age of 65, adults age 65 and 
older, pets).  The descriptive statistics for the sociodemographic variables are in Chapter 4.  The 
dataset codes for gender were transformed for 1 to indicate female and 0 to indicate male or other, 
and the dataset for ethnicity was transformed for 1 to indicate white and 0 to consolidate Hispanic 
or Latino, black or African America, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, American 
Indian or Alaskan Native, and other responses.  The occupation responses were recoded as 1 for 
employed, including self-employed, and 0 for all others.  The responses to the questions 
regarding number of children, adults, and pets living in the household were summed to give a 
total responsibility number. 
Distance. Distance was categorized as near and far for both Population A and Population B.  In 
Population A, the near population includes Oroville, South Oroville, East Oroville, Palermo, and 
Thermalito.  The far Population A includes East Biggs, Gridley City, and East Gridley.  In 
Population B, near is defined as Yuba City, Live Oak, Tierra Buena, Marysville, Hallwood, and 
District 10. Far is defined as Nicholas, Rio Oso, Linda, Olivehurst, Plumas Lake, and Wheatland.   
Warning Receipt Time.  Warning receipt time was the time the respondent reported receiving the 
warning.  The date and time were converted to a continuous variable with t0 equal to midnight on 
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February 12.  Those who received warning prior to February 12 were excluded from any analysis 
using warning receipt time. 
Message Believability.  Message believability measures the extent to which the respondent 
believed the first evacuation message with 1 representing “not at all believable,” and 6 
representing “completely believable.”   
Risk Belief.  Risk belief is measured three ways using a Likert scale with 1 representing “did not 
believe,” and 6 representing “fully believed.”  The measurement assessed the extent to which 
respondents believed the emergency spillway would break, their home would flood, and/or their 
town will flood.  A Risk Belief Index was created by calculating the mean of the three 
measurements.   
Understanding. Understanding measures how well the respondents understood each of the seven 
measurement items (what could happen at the dam; risk of flooding; what actions to take; which 
locations could be affected; when to evacuate; how long to stay away; and who the message was 
from).  A Likert scale was used to assess each measure with 1 representing “did not understand at 
all,” and 6 representing “fully understood.”  An Understanding Index was created by calculating 
the mean of the seven measurements.   
Risk Perception.  Risk perception was measured five different ways on a Likert scale from 1 to 6, 
with 1 representing “not likely,” and 6 representing “extremely likely.” The questions assessed 
include the following: the message was meant for me, I might become injured, other people might 
become injured, I might die, or other people might die. Each respondent’s answers were 
combined into a Risk Perception Index that consists of the mean of the five responses.   
Decision Making.  Decision-making was measured four different ways using a Likert scale with 1 
indicating “disagree,” and 6 indicating “agree.”  The measures were in response to the following:  
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message helped me decide what to do, it was easy to decide what to do, I was able to decide what 
to do quickly, or I decided what to do with confidence.  The mean of the responses make up the 
Decision Making Index.     
Information Searching Channel.  Information searching channel measures which methods of 
communication were used between the receipt of the first evacuation message and the time in 
which the respondent began to evacuate or decided not to evacuate.  Seven choices were given: 
face-to-face conversation, land line phone call, cell phone call, cell phone text message, social 
media such as Facebook or Twitter, other, or I did not communicate with others.  Respondents 
were asked to identify all channels that applied.  Each option is coded as 1 for selected and 0 for 
not selected.   
Information Searching Source. Information searching source measures information seeking 
behavior sources between the first evacuation message and the time the respondent began the 
evacuation or decided not to evacuate.  Seven options were given: friends, relatives, neighbors, 
co-workers; local officials such as fire, sheriff, or police; state officials such as the Department of 
Water Resources, CAL Fire, or Office of Emergency Services; internet/website; social media, for 
example, Facebook or Twitter; other; and I did not seek additional information.  The 
questionnaire allowed for multiple responses, and each source was coded as 1 for selected and 0 
for not selected.   
Pre-evacuation Actions.  Pre-evacuation actions measures whether or not the respondent 
completed any of the nine options listed after receiving warning and before evacuating or 
deciding not to evacuate.  The actions offered were: reunite with family members; reunite or 
attend to pets; secure my home; secure my business; pack items to take with me; told others I was 
going/where I was going; helped others get ready to evacuate; other; and I didn’t do anything 
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before evacuating.  Respondents were allowed to identify multiple actions, and each action was 
coded as a 1 for selected and 0 for not selected. 
Protective Action Initiation. Protective action initiation is measured by whether or not the 
respondent evacuated.  The variable was coded 1 for evacuate and 0 for did not evacuate.   
Protective Action Initiation Delay Time.  Protective Action Initiation Time measures the date and 
time the respondent began to evacuate.  The questionnaire collected this information in two 
questions, one for the date of evacuation, and one for the time in hours and minutes after 
midnight on the day indicated in date response.  The time in hours and minutes was coded as 
minutes after midnight on the day indicated on the day of evacuation.  In order to create a 
consistent time variable, the date and time were recoded to a continuous variable, with t0 as 
midnight on Sunday, February 12.  Those who reported evacuating prior to February 12 were 
excluded from any analysis of protective action initiation delay time. 
3.4 Analytical Methods 
Four statistical tests were used in this study: linear regression, logistic regression, independent 
samples t-tests, and analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Chronbach’s alpha will be used to test the 
reliability of the risk belief, understanding, risk perception, and decision-making indices.   
Appendix 1 identifies the variables and statistical tests for each of the research questions and 
research hypothesis. Research questions WQ1A, WQ1B, EQ1A, and EQ1B will use linear 
regression.  An independent sample t-test will be used for research hypothesis WH1A and WH1B 
and research questions PQ1A, PQ1B, PQ2A, PQ2B, PQ3A, PQ3B, PQ4A, and PQ4B.  Protective 
action initiation hypothesis EH1A and EH1B were tested using logistic regression.  Research 
questions PQ5A and PQ5B will be tested using correlation, and PQ6A, PQ6B, PQ7A, PQ7B, 







4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset includes self-reported information on age, education, income, sex/gender, ethnicity, 
occupation, and role/responsibility for both Population A and Population B.  Comparisons are 
made to the American Community Survey 5-year estimates from the 2012-2016 period for some 
variables by Sorensen and Mileti (2018). Females make up 49.8% of Population A compared to 
49.1% male (n=422).  A little over 1% of Population A indicated other, and thirteen did not 
provide a gender.  In Population B, females comprised 47.4% of respondents, and men were 
52.6% of the respondents (n=390).  Ten people in Population B did not indicate their gender.   
Table 1. Gender of Respondents 
 Percent in Population A  Percent in Population B 
Male 49.052  52.564 
Female 49.763  47.436 
Other 1.185  0.000 
Total 100.000  100.000 
Populations A (83.3%) and Population B (75.4%) identified primarily as white, which is higher 
than the percent of white persons in sampled area population (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  There 
were fewer Hispanic or Latino and Asian persons in the sample populations than in the sampled 
area (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  In Population A, thirteen respondents did not indicate their 
gender and eleven did not indicate a race.  Ten respondents did not indicate their gender and nine 
did not indicate a race/ethnicity in Population B. 
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Table 2. Race/Ethnicity of Respondents* 
 Population A  Population B 








White 83.255 59.700  75.448 49.000 
Hispanic or Latino 8.491 23.100  10.486 30.300 
Black or African 
American 1.179 2.100 
 2.302 2.400 
Asian 1.887 8.300  5.627 12.400 
Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander 0.236 0.200 
 0.767 0.400 
American Indian or 
Alaskan Native 3.302 1.200 
 1.790 0.800 
Other 1.651 6.400  3.581 2.700 
Total 100.000 100.0  100.000 100.000 
* Adapted from John H. Sorensen and Mileti (2018) 
The reported education levels of the respondents over age 25 were higher than those of 
population (Table 3) (Sorensen and Mileti, 2018).  Sorensen and Mileti (2018) reported that of 
the Population A respondents over age 25, 10.2% had less than a high school diploma, whereas 
the total population with less than a high school diploma is 34.5%.  Slightly more people in 
Population A reported graduate degrees (7.2%) compared to the population (5%).  Five 
respondents were under age 25 in Population A.  Eleven respondents in Population A did not 
report an age and were excluded from the statistic. An additional seventeen persons did not report 
an income level.   
Sorensen and Mileti (2018) reported that of the Population B respondents over the age of 25, 
5.9% had less than a high school diploma compared to 36.2% of the population.  In addition, 
67.1% of Population B had a high school diploma or equivalent (compared to 36.4% in the 
population), and 11.1% had a graduate degree (compared to 8.4%) (Sorensen and Mileti, 2018).  
Eight respondents in Population B were under age 25. Six respondents did not report an age and 
were excluded from the statistic. An additional twenty-one persons did not report a level of 
education and were also excluded. 
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Table 3. Education of Respondents Age 25 or Higher* 
 Population A  Population B 








Less than a high school 
diploma 10.199 34.500 
 5.930 36.200 




36.400 Some college but no 
degree 33.582 
 32.075 
Associates Degree 10.945  18.598 
Bachelor Degree 14.179 13.300  15.903 19.000 
Graduate Degree 7.214 5.000  11.051 8.400 
Total 100.000 100.000  100.000 100.000 
* Adapted from John H. Sorensen and Mileti (2018)  
Sorensen and Mileti (2018) also found the median household income of respondents in 
Population A ($25,000 to $34,999) to be slightly lower than the averaged median income of the 
block groups in the sampled area ($39,049).  Population B’s median income ($50,000 to $74,999) 
is higher than the mean of the median household incomes of each block group ($39,049) 
(Sorensen and Mileti, 2018).  Fifty-six respondents did not provide income data in Population A, 
and twenty-eight respondents did not provide income data in Population B.  Table 4 shows the 
income distribution of the respondents with the median income values in bold text. 
Table 5 presents the reported age distribution of respondents.  The median age value of 5 for both 
Population A and Population B corresponds to 55-64 years of age (bolded in Table 3).  Eleven 
respondents did not report an age in Population A, and six respondents did not report an age in 




Table 4. Income of Respondents* 
 Population A  Population B 
 Percent in Sample Cumulative Percent 




Less than $15,000 17.678 17.678  9.140 9.140 
$15,000 - $24,999 18.206 35.884  8.602 17.742 
$25,000 - $34,999 15.303 51.187  13.441 31.183 
$35,000 - $49,999 13.720 64.908  13.441 44.624 
$50,000 - $74,999 16.623 81.530  19.892 64.516 
$75,000 - $99,999 6.596 88.127  13.172 77.688 
$100,000 - $149,999 5.805 93.931  13.441 91.129 
$150,000 - $199,999 3.694 97.625  5.376 96.505 
$200,000 or more 2.375 100.000  3.495 100.000 
Total 100.000   100.000  
No response 56   28  
* Adapted from Sorensen and Mileti (2018). 
Table 5. Age of Respondents 
 
Percent in Population A  Percent in Population B 
18-24 years old 1.179  2.030 
25-34 years old 8.491  7.868 
35-44 years old 10.849  9.137 
45-54 years old 17.925  17.513 
55-64 years old 25.943  27.411 
65-74 years old 20.283  21.066 
75 years or older 15.330  14.975 
Total 100.000  100.000 
Table 6 presents the employment status of respondents for Population A and Population B.  
Slightly less than half of the respondents in Population A are employed (46.1%), whereas most 
respondents in Population B are employed (51.4%).  Approximately 30% of both Population A 
(29.5%) and Population B (30.9%) are retired, and 18.1% of Population A and 12.8% of 








 Percent in 
Population B 
Employed (incl self-employed), working 1-39 hours/week 19.048  15.601 
Employed (incl self-employed), working 40 or more 
hours/week 27.143 
 35.806 
Not employed, looking for work 2.857  1.535 
Not employed, not looking for work 1.429  1.023 
Retired 29.524  30.946 
Disabled, not able to work 18.095  12.788 
Stay at home mom/dad 1.905  2.302 
Total 100.000  100.000 
On the day the evacuation order was issued, the median number of persons living in the 
household for both Population A and Population B was 2.  The mean number of persons living in 
the household was 2.69 in Population A and 2.79 in Population B.   The maximum number 
reported was twenty for both Population A and Population B.  Twelve respondents did not 
provide a response on household size in Population A, and thirteen did not in Population B.  The 
mean number of children under the age of 18 was 0.89 in Population A and 0.83 in Population B. 
The median value for both populations was zero.  The mean number of persons age 65 or older in 
respondent households was 0.93 in Population A and 0.92 in Population B, with a median of 1 in 
both sample populations.  The mean number of pets present was 3.47 in Population A and 2.2 in 
Population B, with a median value of 2 in Population A and 1 in Population B. 
In Population A, most of the people (82.1%) live in the near population, defined in Section 3.3.1 
as Oroville, South Oroville, East Oroville, Palermo, and Thermalito.  The remainder resided in 
East Biggs, Gridley City, and East Gridley, all of which are farther from the dam.  In Population 
B, 71.6% of the population live in the near population, and 28.4% comprise the far population.  
The near population of Population B resides in Yuba City, Live Oak, Tierra Buena, Marysville, 
Hallwood, and District 10, whereas the far population resides in Nicholas, Rio Oso, Linda, 
Olivehurst, Plumas Lake, and Wheatland.  Table 7 shows the breakdown of the near and far sub-
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populations of each sample population.  Respondents who selected “other” as their residence city 
were not assigned a sub-population of near or far for either Population A or Population B. 
Table 7. Near and Far Population Totals 
 Population A  Population B 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Near 321 82.097  270 71.618 
Far 70 17.903  107 28.382 
Total  100.000   100.000 
Protective action was measured by the question “Did you evacuate?”  In Population A, 68.2% of 
the respondents evacuated, whereas 31.8% did not.  A larger percent of Population A’s far sub-
population evacuated than the population near the dam.  In Population B, 68.9% evacuated and 
31.1% did not.  A larger percentage of the near sub-population evacuated than the far.  Seven 
respondents did not provide an answer in Population A, and ten respondents did not provide an 
answer in Population B.  Table 8 shows the evacuation results for Population A and Population B 
broken out by the near and far sub-populations.   
Table 8. Evacuation 
 Population A  Population B 











Near 65.506 34.494 100.000  70.076 29.924 100.000 
Far 80.882 19.118 100.000  66.019 33.980 100.000 
Total 68.229 31.771 100.000  68.937 31.063 100.000 
* Adapted from Sorensen and Mileti (2018). 
4.2  Index Reliability 
Understanding, risk belief, risk perception, and decision making included multiple measurements 
in the survey; an index was created for each (Table 9).  Understanding was measured as how well 
the respondent understood each of the seven measures related to flooding (what could happen at 
the dam; flood risk; what actions to take; which locations could be affected; when to evacuate; 
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how long to stay away; who the message was from), with 1 indicating “did not understand at all,” 
and 6 indicating “fully understood.”  The Understanding Index has a Chronbach’s a= .879 for 
Population A (M=4.220) and .892 for Population B (M=4.301), indicating the questionnaire 
achieved an acceptable level of reliability.  A mean above the midrange (3-4) indicates the 
respondents moderately understood the message, what could happen at Oroville dam, and what 
actions to take.  However, the mean value indicates there is also room to improve the 
understanding of the potentially impacted public.  
Whether or not respondents believed the message (risk belief) was measured three different ways 
(the spillway would break, my home would flood, my town would flood).  The resulting risk 
belief index has a mean of 4.139 for Population A and 4.080 for Population B, with 1 indicating 
“not at all believable,” and 6 indicating “completely believable.”  The index mean is slightly 
higher than the midrange (3-4) indicating the respondents moderately believed the spillway would 
break and flooding would occur.  The Cronbach’s alpha (Chronbach’s a= .838 for Population A 
and Chronbach’s a=.886 for Population B) showed the questionnaire reached an acceptable level 
of reliability. 
Five measurements (the message was meant for me, I might become injured, other people might 
become injured, I might die, or other people might die) represent risk perception after receiving 
the first evacuation message, with 1 indicating “not likely,” and 6 indicating “extremely likely.”  
The measurements were combined into an index (Population A Chronbach’s a= .861and 
Population B Chronbach’s a=.908) with a resulting mean of 3.916 for Population A and 3.968 
for Population B, indicating that respondents perceived moderate risk to property or people.  The 
questionnaire reached an acceptable level of reliability. 
Decision-making was measured four different ways (the message helped me decide what to do, it 
was easy to decide what to do, I was able to decide what to do quickly, or I decided what to do 
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with confidence), with 1 indicating “disagree,” and 6 indicating “agree.”  The resulting decision-
making index has a mean of 4.368 for Population A and 4.445 for Population B.  Mean values 
above the mid-range indicate the message to evacuate helped in deciding, deciding was easy and 
quick, and the respondents were confident in deciding.  The Cronbach’s alpha (Population A 
Chronbach’s a= .898; Population B Chronbach’s a=.908) showed the questionnaire reached an 
acceptable level of reliability. 
Table 9. Index Statistics 









 Understanding 357 3.028 4.655 4.220 9.578 .879 
Risk belief 363 3.507 4.499 4.139 4.563 .838 
Risk perception 363 2.909 4.636 3.916 7.437 .861 
Decision-







Understanding 338 3.101 4.695 4.301 9.374 .892 
Risk belief 353 3.773 4.450 4.080 4.674 .886 
Risk perception 345 2.890 4.658 3.968 7.056 .857 
Decision-
making 349 4.344 4.521 4.445 6.171 .908 
 
4.3 Addressing the Research Questions and Hypothesis 
4.3.1 Warning Diffusion 
Linear regression was used to answer research questions (WQ) 1A (Which warning receiver 
sociodemographic characteristics predict warning receipt time in Population A?) and WQ1B 
(Which warning receiver sociodemographic characteristics predict warning receipt time in the 
Population B).  Table 10 shows the results of the linear regression.  The results indicate that age, 
education, and income explain 3.3% of the variance in the time it took to receive warning in 
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Population B.  Income is a significant predictor of warning receipt time in Population B.  Age and 
education were not a significant predictor of warning receipt time in either population.  The 
model results for Population A were not significant.  
Table 10. Regression Analysis Warning Receipt 
Model Population A (WQ1A)  Population B (WQ1B) 
(Constant) 1147.754  1169.884 
Age -5.683  18.881 
Education -35.741*  -19.169 




Adj. R2 = .005 
 F(3)=4.205 
p=.008* 
Adj. R2 = .033 
*The statistic is significant at the p<.05 level. 
Table 11. Independent-Samples T-Test Warning Receipt Time versus Distance 
  Distance 
95% CI for 
Mean 
Difference 
     
 Near  Far    





1009.40 357.174 240  1025.29 317.425 51 
-122.303, 





1053.97 344.780 200  1108.63 426.143 83 
-149.849, 
40.563 
-1.130 281 .259 
 
Independent-samples t-tests were used to test research hypothesis (WH) 1A (People in 
Population A who live nearer to Oroville Dam receive warning before those farther away.) and 
WH1B (People in Population B who live nearer to Oroville Dam receive warning before those 
farther away.).  Table 11 demonstrates the results of independent-samples t-tests when comparing 
the time (minutes) of reported warning receipt (warning receipt time) of those nearer to, and 
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farther from Oroville dam in both Population A and Population B.  The results were not 
significant for Population A or Population B. 
4.3.2 Protective Action Initiation Delay 
Independent-samples t-tests were used to test risk perception research question 1A (PQ1) (Do 
people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam perceive risk differently than people farther 
away?) and PQ1B (Do people in Population B living nearer to Oroville Dam perceive risk 
differently than people farther away?).  The test compared the risk perception index for those 
nearer and farther from Oroville Dam (Table 12).   The results indicate there was not a significant 
difference in risk perception of those nearer to Oroville Dam or farther away in Population A or 
Population B.  
Table 12. Independent-Samples T-Test – Risk Perception Index versus Distance 




     
 Near  Far    










3.940 1.453 243  4.054 1.277 99 -.449, 
.222 
-.666 340 .506 
 
To answer PQ2A (Do people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam understand the 
warning message differently than those farther way?) and PQ2B (Do people in Population B 
living nearer to Oroville Dam understand the warning message differently than those farther 
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way?) independent-samples t-tests were used to compare the understand index means, to distance 
(Table 13).  There was not a significant difference in understanding of those nearer to Oroville 
Dam compared to those farther away in Population A or Population B.   
Table 13. Independent-Samples T-Test -- Understanding Index versus Distance 




     
 Near  Far    




4.291 1.262 281   4.088 1.470 62 
-.178, 




4.252 1.348 245  4.405 1.325 99 -.467, 
.161 
-.958 342 .339 
 
Independent samples t-tests were also used to test PQ3A (Do people in Population A living 
nearer to Oroville dam believe the risks could materialize differently than those farther away?) 
and PQ3B (Do people in Population B living nearer to Oroville dam believe the risks could 
materialize differently than those farther away?), comparing the risk belief index with distance.  
There was a significant difference in mean risk belief of those nearer to Oroville Dam compared 
to those farther away in Population A.  People who live closer to the dam in Population A had a 
greater mean belief that the risk could materialize than those farther away (Near M= 4.254, SD= 
1.482; Far M=3.725, SD=1.808; t(342)=2.455, p=.015 ).  The means were not significantly different 





Table 14. Independent Samples T-Test - Risk Belief versus Distance 




     
 Near  Far    










4.094 1.572 245  4.040 1.572 99 -.315, 
.422 
.286 342 .775 
* p<.05 
 
PQ4A (Do people in Population A living nearer to Oroville Dam report the evacuation message 
aided in decision making differently than those farther away?) and PQ4B (Do people in 
Population B living nearer to Oroville Dam report the evacuation message aided in decision 
making differently than those farther away?), compare distance with the decision-making index.  
There was not a significant difference in the decision making of those nearer to Oroville Dam 






Table 15. Independent Samples T-Test -- Decision-Making Index 




     
 Near  Far    






4.421 1.571 279  4.153 1.689 62 
-.172, 










1.162 339 .246 
 
Correlation analysis was used to answer PQ5A (What are the correlations among Population1's 
message belief, risk belief, understanding, risk perception, and decision-making?).  The results 
are presented in Table 16.  Believability of the evacuation message (message belief) is positively 
correlated with risk belief (r=.454, p<.01), understanding (r=.433, p<.01), risk perception 
(r=.418, p<.01), and decision-making (r=.338, p<.01) in Population A.    
Table 16. Correlations Between Message Belief, Risk Belief, Understanding, Risk Perception, 
and Decision-Making in Population A 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Message Belief -     
2. Risk Belief Index .454** -    
3. Understand Index .433** .330** -   
4. Risk Perception Index .418** .642** .317** -  
5. Decision-Making Index .338** .229** .567** .272** - 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlation analysis was also used to answer PQ5B (What are the correlations among Population 
B's message belief, risk belief, understanding, risk perception, and decision-making?).  The 
results are presented in Table 17.  Believability of the evacuation message (message belief) is 
positively correlated with risk belief (r=.515, p<.01), understanding (r=.399, p<.01), risk 
perception (r=.450, p<.01), and decision-making (r=.375, p<.01) in Population B. 
Table 17. Correlations Between Message Belief, Risk Belief, Understanding, Risk Perception, 
and Decision-Making in Population B 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Message Belief -     
2. Risk Belief Index .515** -    
3. Understand Index .399** .416** -   
4. Risk Perception Index .450** .591** .333** -  
5. Decision-Making Index .375** .359** .593** .294** - 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
Repeated-measure ANOVA was used to answer PQ6A (After first warning, how did Population A 
seek information?) and PQ6B (After first warning, how did Population B communicate with 
others?).  In Population A (Wilks’ Lambda = .462; F(6, 429)=92.916, p<.01) and Population B 
(Wilks’ Lambda = .427; F(6, 394)=113.657, p<.01), the channels used are significantly different 
across groups.  Cell phone call, face-to-face, conversation, and cell phone text messages were the 
most popular channels in Population A and in Population B.  Table 18  shows the means of each 
channel by population.  
Repeated measure ANOVA was also used to answer PQ7A (From which sources did Population 
A seek additional information?) and PQ7B (From which sources did Population B seek 
additional information?).  The information source used are significantly different across groups 
in Population A (Wilks’ Lambda = .500; F(6, 429)=74.411, p<.01) and Population B (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .550; F(6, 394)=53.739, p<.01),.  In both Population A and in Population B, respondents 
sought information from friends, relatives, neighbors, and co-workers more than any other source.     
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Table 18. Information Searching Channel 
 Population A 
(N= 435) 
 Population B 
(N=400) 
 M S.D.  M S.D. 
1. Face-to-Face Conversation .315 .465  .360 .481 
2. Land Line Phone Call .211 .409  .210 .408 
3. Cell Phone Call .552 .498  .605 .489 
4. Cell Phone Text Message .290 .454  .380 .486 
5. Social Media .140 .348  .127 .334 
6. Other .028 .164  .035 .184 
7. Did Not Communicate with Others .080 .272  .060 .238 
 Wilks’ Lambda =.462 
F(6,429)=92.916 
p<.01 




Table 19. Information Searching Source 
 Population A 
(N= 435) 
 Population B 
(N=400) 
 M S.D.  M S.D. 
1. Friends, Relatives, Neighbors, Co-workers .494 .501  .532 .500 
2. Local Officials .103 .305  .133 .339 
3. State Officials .053 .224  .107 .310 
4. Internet - Website .147 .355  .168 .374 
5. Social Media .168 .374  .147 .355 
6. Other .108 .311  .105 .307 
7. Did Not Seek Additional Information .225 .418  .208 .406 
 Wilks’ Lambda =.500 
F(6,429)=74.411 
p<.01 




PQ8A (What actions did Population A take after being warned and before evacuation or deciding 
not to evacuate?) and PQ8B (What actions did Population B take after being warned and before 
evacuation or deciding not to evacuate?) were also analyzed using repeated measure ANOVA.  
In both Population A (Wilks’ Lambda = .414; F(8, 427)=745.693, p<.01) and Population B (Wilks’ 
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Lambda = .322; F(8, 392)=102.973, p<.01), pre-evacuation actions varied significantly across action 
type.  Population A and Population B packed items to take with during the evacuation and 
secured their homes.   
Table 20. Pre-evacuation Actions 
 Population A 
(N= 435) 
 Population B 
(N=400) 
 M S.D.  M S.D. 
1. Reunite with Family Members .329 .470  .315 .465 
2. Reunite or Attend to Pets .262 .440  .303 .460 
3. Secure My Home .409 .492  .523 .500 
4. Secure My Business .025 .157  .028 .164 
5. Pack Items to Take With Me .584 .493  .668 .472 
6. Told Other I Was Going/Where I Was Going .356 .479  .422 .495 
7. Helped Others Get Ready to Evacuate .175 .380.  .175 .380 
8. Other .080 .272  .050 .218 
7. Did Not Do Anything Before Evacuating .080 .272  .078 .268 
 Wilks’ Lambda =.414 
F(8,427) =745.693  
p<.01 




4.3.3 Protective Action Initiation 
A logistic regression was used to test protective action initiation hypotheses 1A (EH1A) 
(Message believability, risk belief, risk perception, understanding, decision-making, distance, 
warning receipt time, and sociodemographic characteristics predict whether people in 
Population A evacuated.).  The logistic regression model is statistically significant (X2(14)=66.369, 
p<.01), and the results are shown in Table 21.  In Population A, the model explained 37.1% of the 
variance in the dependent variable – evacuation (Nagelkerke R2=.371) – and correctly classified 
82.8% of the evacuations.  Risk belief, risk perception, decision making, distance, income, and 
warning receipt time are significant predictors of evacuation.  For every unit increase in risk 
belief (Wald=5.000, df=1, p<.05), the likelihood of evacuation increases 1.48 times after 
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controlling for the other variables in the model.  For each unit increase in risk perception 
(Wald=4.267, df=1, p<.05), the likelihood of evacuation increases 1.477 times.  Evacuation 
likelihood increases 1.402 times for each unit increase in the decision-making index 
(Wald=4.604, df=1, p=<.05).  For each unit nearer to the dam (Wald=8.811, df=1, p=<.01), 
evacuation likelihood increases 6.117 times.  Each unit increase in income (Wald=7.159, df=1, 
p=<.01) results in a .763 increase in evacuation likelihood.  Finally, as warning receipt time 
(Wald=5.447, df=1, p=<.05) increases, the likelihood of evacuation increases .999, indicating 
later warning receipt decreases evacuation likelihood.  Had the warning receipt time been 
measured in hours, a more meaningful result might become evident. 
Table 21. Logistic Regression Population A 
  Wald df ρ Exp(β) 
Message Believability  1.380 1 0.240 0.849 
Risk Belief Index  5.000 1 0.025* 1.480 
Understand Index  3.353 1 0.067 0.691 
Risk Perception Index  4.267 1 0.039* 1.477 
Decision-making Index  4.604 1 0.032* 1.402 
Distance (Near)  8.811 1 0.003** 6.117 
Female  1.865 1 0.172 1.650 
White  0.441 1 0.506 1.387 
Employed  0.000 1 0.991 0.995 
Responsibility  0.013 1 0.911 0.999 
Age  2.323 1 0.127 0.802 
Education  0.010 1 0.921 1.015 
Income  7.159 1 0.007** 0.763 
Warning Receipt Time  5.447 1 0.020* 0.999 
Constant  1.223 1 0.269 4.378 
* The regression coefficient is significant at the <.05 level. 
** The regression coefficient is significant at the <.01 level.  
 
A logistic regression was used to test EH1B (Message believability, risk belief, risk perception, 
understanding, decision-making, distance, warning receipt time, and sociodemographic 
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characteristics predict whether people in Population B evacuated.)  The logistic regression model 
is statistically significant (X2(14)=37.633, p<.01), and the results are shown in (Table 22).  In 
Population B, the model explained 21.7% of the variance in the dependent variable – evacuation 
(Nagelkerke R2=.217) – and correctly classified 74.1% of evacuations.  Message believability, 
decision-making, and race (white) are significant predictors of evacuation.  For every unit 
increase in message believability (Wald=64.343, df=1, p<.05), the likelihood of evacuation 
increases 1.312 times, after controlling for other variables in the model.  Similarly, for each unit 
increase in the decision-making index (Wald=10.293, df=1, p<.01), the likelihood of evacuation 
increases 1.543 times.  White people were .425 times more likely to evacuate (Wald=3.981, df=1, 
p<.05). 
Table 22. Logistic Regression Population B 
  Wald df ρ Exp(β) 
Message Believability  4.343 1 0.037* 1.312 
Risk Belief Index  0.004 1 0.952 0.992 
Understand Index  2.740 1 0.098 0.765 
Risk Perception Index  0.042 1 0.838 1.032 
Decision-making Index  10.293 1 0.001** 1.543 
Distance (Far)  2.220 1 0.136 0.590 
Female  0.401 1 0.526 1.234 
White  3.981 1 0.046* 0.425 
Employed  0.461 1 0.497 0.772 
Responsibility  0.031 1 0.861 0.993 
Age  1.984 1 0.159 0.838 
Education  3.633 1 0.057 1.300 
Income  0.683 1 0.409 0.921 
Warning Receipt Time  1.413 1 0.235 0.999 
Constant  0.201 1 0.654 1.790 
* The regression coefficient is significant at the <.05 level. 




Linear regression was used to answer research questions EQ1A (Does message believability, 
warning receipt time, risk belief, understanding, risk perception, decision making, distance, and 
socioeconomic considerations predict protective action initiation time in Population A?) and 
EQ1B (Does message believability, warning receipt time, risk belief, understanding, risk 
perception, decision making, distance, and socioeconomic considerations predict protective 
action initiation time in Population B).  The results ( 
Table 23) indicate warning receipt time (t=4.684, p<.01) is the only significant predictor of 
protective action initiation time in Population A.  Warning receipt time (t=8.078, p<.01), message 
believability (t=-2.010, p=<.05), and income (t=-43.074, p<.05) are significant predictors of 
protective action initiation time in Population B.   
Table 23. Regression Analysis – Protective Action (Evacuation) Initiation Time 
Model  Protective action (evacuation) time: Population A 
Protective action (evacuation) 
time: Population B 
(Constant)  496.419 1084.86 
Warning Receipt Time  0.588** 0.766** 
Message Believability  19.058 -53.805* 
Risk Belief Index  6.91 2.864 
Understanding Index  46.48 -9.04 
Risk Perception Index  -26.52 20.881 
Decision Making Index  -28.704 -20.964 
Distance  57.099 -58.493 
Age  -3.969 12.058 
Education  -13.38 6.971 
Income  -26.273 -43.074* 
Gender (Female)  -10.534 -30.725 
Race (White)  18.218 -89.589 
Employed  63.195 1.102 








* The regression coefficient is significant at the <.05 level. 








The purpose of this research was to understand protective action decision making in a slow onset 
dam incident and to test which variables can predict warning diffusion, and protective action 
initiation delay, and protective action initiation (evacuation).  Analysis of the data collected 
revealed some new findings, while also supporting and refuting previous studies.  This chapter 
discusses in detail the results from Chapter 4.   
5.1 Warning Diffusion 
Government issued warnings facilitate evacuation for many people (Drabek, 2013; Huang et al., 
2016).  Understanding how warning moves through a population (warning diffusion), including 
who is warned and when, can increase the number of people warned.  Population A and 
Population B were both divided into a near and far sub-population to evaluate the impact of 
distance from the event center on warning diffusion.  Results of WH1A and WH1B, testing 
whether warning receipt time varied by distance for each population, were not significant, 
indicating there is not a relationship between distance (near and far populations) and mean 
warning time in Population A or in Population B.  Sorensen (1991) found a weak relationship 
between the distance from the hazard site and when warning was received, with nearer 
populations receiving warning earlier than those farther away.  The results are also inconsistent 
with additional research on distance (Lindell, 2018; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Sorensen, 1991); 
however, the slow speed of the onset of the event or the unofficial warnings that began  
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approximately a week prior to the first official warning (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018) could explain 
why the results were not significant.  The subconscious exposure and comprehension of the pre-
warning messages related to the ongoing incident at Oroville Dam and the time that passed 
between the incident and data collection may have led to some households not recalling the 
warning, or inaccurately recalling their first warning (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012; 
Sorensen & Mileti, 2018; Wu et al., 2015).  In addition, in Population A, the sample contained 
households that were not at risk, which may result in warning message time recall failure.  The 
lack of difference may also be explained by the lack of data on each structure’s distance from the 
dam, error in the reported times due to the amount of time that had passed from the event until the 
survey was administered, or by the lack of responses from households farthest from the dam in 
Population B.  Finally, identifying the sample of Population A was hindered by the message 
indicating that “low lying” areas should evacuate, so the sample likely over-represents people 
who were not at risk and may not recall receiving warning (Sorensen & Mileti, 2018). 
Analysis of which sociodemographic characteristics predict warning receipt time for Population 
A (WQ1A) and Population B (WQ1B) did not produce significant results in Population A, but 
income predicted warning receipt time in Population B.  The results for Population A indicate that 
income, age, and education are not predictors of when warning will be received and other 
variables may be influencing warning receipt time.  Income predicted warning receipt time in 
Population B.  Population B’s median income is higher than that of the overall population, which 
should indicate better access to evacuation information overall; however, technologies, frequency 
of warning, informal notifications, where people were, and what they were doing might better 
predict the time in which warning was first received.  The results augment past findings where 
older people were less likely to hear a warning, and those of high socioeconomic status are more 
likely to hear a warning (Sorensen, 1991).  Sorensen and Mileti (2018) examine technologies, 
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frequency of warning, informal notifications, where people were, and what they were doing, all of 
which might better predict the time in which warning was first received. 
5.2 Protective Action Initiation Delay 
Mileti and Sorensen (1990) describe the warning response process of hearing, understanding, 
believing, personalizing, deciding and responding, and confirming as an ordered-choice process, 
even if it is not linear for everyone.  Hearing the alert or warning was covered in the prior section.  
The following tests assess the remaining portions of the warning response process.   
PQ2A and PQ2B tested whether understanding varied for the near and far sub-populations for 
both Population A (PQ2A) and Population B (PQ2B).  Understanding was measured with seven 
questions on the survey, each measured on a Likert scale of 1 (did not understand at all), to 6 
(fully understood).  The questions assessed what could happen at the dam, risk of flooding, what 
to do, what locations would be affected, when to evacuate, how long to stay away, and who the 
message was from. It should be noted that “understanding does not refer to correct interpretation 
of what is heard, but rather to the personal attachment of meaning to the message” (Dennis S 
Mileti & Sorensen, 1990a, pp. 5-2).  However, when the understand matrix is combined, it does 
measure an understanding of the risks associated with the Oroville Dam incident.  Neither 
Population A’s near and far populations (PQ2A), nor Population B’s near and far populations 
(PQ2B), had significantly different means, indicating that understanding did not vary 
significantly by distance.   
The risk belief index measured whether respondents believed the spillway would break, their 
home would flood, and their town would flood, with 1 indicating “did not believe,” and 6 
indicating “fully believed.”  The questions reflect personal risk, which is thought to be necessary 
for initiating protective action (Huang et al., 2016; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Sorensen, 1991; 
Sorensen, 2000). In Population A (PQ3A), the near sub-population and far sub-population had 
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significantly different risk belief means, with the near population having a greater risk belief 
mean (M=4.254) than the far population (M= 3.725).  This suggests that risk belief varies by 
distance.  However, the results were not significant in Population B (PQ3B).  The lack of 
responses from households farthest from the dam may influence this result.     
Results of prior studies on flood risk and risk perception have produced mixed results, and the 
same was true for this research.   Results of PQ1A and PQ1B tested whether risk perception was 
different in the near and far populations of Population A (PQ1A) and Population B (PQ1B).  Risk 
perception was measured five different ways, each with a Likert scale with 1 indicating “not 
likely,” and 6 indicating “extremely likely.”  The tests were not significant, indicating risk 
perception did not vary based on distance from Oroville Dam.  This is consistent with conclusions 
from O'Neill et al. (2016) that distance to a perceived flood zone does not impact flood risk 
perception.  Maderthaner et al. (1978) found that persons living nearer to a nuclear reactor 
perceived the risks lower than those who lived farther away at .5km and 1.4km, but those living 
on average 10km away from the reactor rated the risks the same as those living close.  The 
distances within both Population A and Population B may be significant enough to produce a 
similar result; however, additional location data would be necessary to determine if that is true.   
The decision-making index reflects the mean of four questions related to decision-making in the 
survey: the message helped me decide what to do, it was easy to decide what to do, I was able to 
decide what to do quickly, and I decided what to do with confidence.  Each was measured on a 
Likert scale of 1 (disagree) to 6 (agree).   Neither Population A (PQ4A), nor Population B 
(PQ4B) produced significant results when comparing the means between the near and far 
populations.  This might be explained by the amount of time available for the population to 
decide, the slow onset of the dam incident, or the time lag between the incident and data 
collection.     
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PQ5A and PQ5B examined correlations between the message belief, risk belief index, understand 
index, risk perception index, and decision-making index.  The correlation tests whether the steps 
of the warning process are related to one another.  In Population A (PQ5A), the findings 
demonstrate that message belief is moderately correlated with risk belief, understanding, risk 
perception, and decision making.  Each index is also correlated to the others: risk belief and risk 
perception showed a strong positive correlation.   The remaining indices are moderately 
correlated.  Population B’s results (PQ5B) also showed a moderate positive correlation between 
message belief and the indices.  The indices were also moderately correlated.   
The risk belief, understand, risk perception, and decision-making warning response process 
described by Mileti and Sorensen (1990b) is predicated on a believable warning message.  
Increases in message belief are thought to increase risk perception and personal risk belief 
(Lindell, 2018; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990), therein motivating evacuation behaviors. This suggests 
that efforts to increase belief in messages would increase risk perception.  However, Horney et al. 
(2010) found that while risk perception and flood risk are correlated, neither risk perception or 
actual flood risk were related to evacuation decision making in Hurricane Isabel, which indicates 
a more complex relationship between risk perception and taking protective action. For example, 
O'Neill et al. (2016) found that the distance to the perceived flood zone does impact flood risk 
perception.  The results of this study provide empirical evidence of a correlation between 
message belief and the warning decision process for a slow onset dam incident.   
Mileti and Sorensen (1990b) describe confirmation of the warning message as ongoing 
throughout the warning response process and influencing the other aspects of the process.  When 
warning messages do not contain all the information people want or need, they seek additional 
information (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990b; Rogers & 
Sorensen, 1988). The results indicate that information searching did occur during the Oroville 
Dam incident after the first warning message was received and before initiating protective action 
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or deciding not to take protective action, and that the information seeking varies significantly by 
source.   In Population A, 55% of the population responded that they sought information via a cell 
phone call, followed by 31% from a face-to-face conversation, whereas social media was the 
lowest used information channel.   Population B sought information primarily through a cell 
phone call (60%), cell phone text message (38%), and face-to-face conversation (36%). Social 
media was also the lowest used channel (13%) in Population B.  The information searching 
source most utilized in both Population A and B was through personal interaction with a friend, 
relative, neighbor, or coworker (Population A 49% and Population B 53%).  Nearly a quarter of 
Population A and a fifth of Population B did not seek additional information.  
In addition to seeking additional information, protective action initiation was delayed while 
people took additional actions to prepare for evacuation.  Here, too, the results varied 
significantly by action in both Population A and Population B.  In Population A, 58% of the 
population took time to pack items to take with them, 41% secured their home, 36% informed 
others they were evacuating, and 33% reunited with family members.  In Population B, 67% took 
time to pack items to take with them, 52% secured their home, and 42% told others where they 
were going.   
5.3 Protective Action Initiation 
In hurricane evacuation studies, distance from the coast is related to evacuation departure time 
indicating that those living farther from the coast begin their evacuations later (Lindell et al., 
2011; O'Neill et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2012). Lindell et al. (2005) also found proximity to the coast 
and inland waterways were important environmental cues in evacuating prior to Hurricane Lili 
and evacuation rates decreased relative to the predicted landfall point.  The tests in this section 
examine the relationship between message believability, risk belief, understanding, risk 
perception, decision making, distance, warning receipt time, and sociodemographic 
characteristics and protective action. 
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PH1A and PH1B hypothesized that message believability, risk belief, understanding, risk 
perception, decision-making, distance, warning receipt time, and sociodemographic 
characteristics predict whether people in Population A (PH1A) and Population B (PH1B) took 
protective action (evacuated).  The model explained approximately 37% of the variance in 
Population A’s evacuating behavior and 21.7% in Population B.   Risk belief, risk perception, 
decision making, distance, income, and warning receipt time were significant predictors of 
evacuation in Population A.  Message believability, decision making, and race were significant 
predictors of evacuation in Population B.   
The results of PQ2A and PQ2B tested whether message believability, warning receipt time, risk 
belief, understanding, risk perception, decision making, distance, and socioeconomic 
considerations predict protective action initiation time in Population A (PQ2A) and Population B 
(PQ2B).   In Population A, warning receipt time predicts protective action initiation time.  In 
Population B, warning receipt time, message believability, and income were predictors of 
protective action initiation time. Dash and Gladwin (2007) identify risk perceptions as a key 
factor in evacuation decision making, but Sorensen (1991) found the level of risk perception does 
not always lead to a quicker response.  That was the case at Oroville Dam as well.  
The warning response process should culminate in taking protective action (Mileti and Sorensen, 
1990). In Population A, the risk belief, risk perception, and decision-making indices were a 
significant predictor of evacuation, indicating that the personalization and perception of risk and 
decision making motivate evacuation.   However, none of the indices predicted the time in which 
protective action would be initiated in Population A, indicating that the warning response process 
is important for deciding whether or not to evacuate, but perhaps less predictive of when people 
will initiate evacuation.  Population A’s result are consistent with past research, indicating that 
whether a message is believed or understood is less important than the personalization of the risk 
(Mileti & Sorensen, 1990).   
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Increases in warning receipt time in Population A decreased the likelihood of evacuation and 
increased the protective action initiation time.  This indicates that those who receive warning later 
are less likely to evacuate, and receiving warning later delays the initiation of the evacuation.  
Those living near the dam in Population A were six times more likely to evacuate than those 
farther from Oroville Dam.  Past research indicates those nearest the hazard are more likely to 
evacuate (Lindell et al., 2011; Lindell et al., 2005; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990a; O'Neill et al., 2016; 
Sorensen & Mileti, 1988; Wu et al., 2012), and those farther from a hazard evacuate after those 
nearer (Wu et al., 2012).   
Income was also a significant predictor of evacuation in Population A, but not protective action 
initiation time.  The results indicate that increases in income decrease the likelihood of 
evacuation, which is inconsistent with past results based on other hazard types where those who 
have the means to evacuate, as indicated by higher incomes, are more likely to do so (Mileti & 
Sorensen, 1990).  This might be explained by the fact that Population A likely over-represents 
people who were not at risk.   
In Population B, unit increase in message belief increases the odds of evacuation by 31% and 
decreases the protective action initiation time.  Message belief could reflect the quality of the 
message provided for Population B, which would be consistent with past findings (Mileti & 
Sorensen, 1990); however, there is not enough information in the model to determine why 
message belief was a significant predictor for evacuation behavior.  The decision-making index 
shows a 54% increase in evacuation, but did not predict protective action initiation time.  The 
lack of significance of risk belief and risk perception is inconsistent with past results and the 
conceptual models of Lindell and Perry (2012), Lindell (2018), and Mileti and Sorensen (1990b).   
In Population B, as warning receipt time increases, so did the protective action initiation time 
indicating those warned later also evacuated later. This trend was similar with those with higher 
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incomes.  This suggests that the “milling process,” including message verification, contemplating 
personal consequences, and evaluating protective action options, took place (Drabek, 1999; Mileti 
& Sorensen, 1990b; Sorensen & Mileti, 1988; Urbanik et al., 1980). Taking longer to evacuate, 
but being clear in the decision (decision making index) suggests that people had time to 
contemplate their decision and then initiate evacuation.  This might not be the case in a quick 








Though the bodies of literature available on evacuation behavior and on mechanisms of dam 
incidents and failure are voluminous, the infrequent occurrence of incidents involving dams limits 
the amount of research available on evacuation and protective action decision making for such 
incidents.  This research sought to improve understanding of evacuation behaviors around dam 
incidents.  Ultimately, the research could aid in improved predictive models, and help those 
responsible for warning the public with their decisions, ultimately reducing fatalities should a 
dam fail.  This study utilized data collected by Drs. Mileti and Sorensen (2018) to consider 
evacuation notice and response during the 2017 Oroville Dam incident. A combined twenty 
research questions and four research hypotheses were tested by applying quantitative methods to 
survey data for Population A and Population B.  This chapter discusses the resulting conclusions, 
implications for practice, study limitations, and opportunities for further research.   
6.1 Warning Diffusion and Protective Action Initiation 
Infrastructure, including dams, will continue to play an important role in water resource 
development; however, dams do not completely eliminate flood risk and their presence introduces 
an additional risk to the public.  When risks are introduced, human behaviors are influenced, 
impacting how and when individuals take protective action, such as moving out of harm’s way in 
the face of a dam incident.  Understanding and estimating warning diffusion, protective action 
initiation time, and protective action initiation related to dams can save people’s lives. 
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Government issued warnings facilitate evacuation for many people (Drabek, 2013; Huang et al., 
2016).  Mileti and Sorensen (1990b) describe a warning response process of hearing, 
understanding, believing, personalizing, deciding and responding, and confirming the warning 
message.  Warning receipt time did not vary by distance in this study, but that may be due to 
subconscious exposure and comprehension of the pre-warning messages related to the risks, 
which may have led to some households not recalling the warning, or inaccurately recalling their 
first warning (Lindell, 2018; Lindell & Perry, 2012; Sorensen & Mileti, 2018; Wu et al., 2015).  
Research has demonstrated that demographic characteristics do not always produce consistent 
patterns (Arlikatti et al., 2007; Lindell et al., 2009), which was also the case in this study. 
Distance did not provide statistically significant differences in understanding, risk perception, or 
decision-making for either Population A or Population B in this study.  Risk belief of the near 
population in Population A was higher than that of the far population; however, mean risk belief 
was not significantly different in Population B.  This may be because of the construct of the 
distance variable and the need to keep Population A and Population B analysis separate from one 
another due to different rates of inclusion in the study sample.  However, message belief and 
understanding, risk belief, risk perception, and decision-making were correlated, indicating that 
there is a relationship between belief in the warning message and the personalization of risks 
during the Oroville Dam incident.  Increases in message belief are thought to increase risk 
perception and personal risk belief (Lindell, 2018; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990), which motivate 
evacuation behaviors suggesting that efforts to increase belief in messages would increase risk 
personalization.   
The process of confirming the warning message was evident in the Oroville Dam incident, as 
people in Population A and Population B sought additional information.  For both populations, 
the information seeking varies significantly by channel and source.  In addition to seeking 
additional information, protective action initiation was delayed while people took additional 
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actions to prepare for evacuation, indicating that preparedness for an event, or lead time to 
prepare, could reduce the overall time to take protective action.  
The warning response process should culminate in taking protective action (Mileti and Sorensen, 
1990), which is why protective action and protective action initiation time were evaluated.  Risk 
belief, risk perception, decision making, distance, income, and warning receipt time were 
significant predictors of evacuation in Population A, and warning receipt time was a predictor of 
protective action initiation time.  Message believability, decision making, and race were 
significant predictors of evacuation in Population B, and warning receipt time, message 
believability, and income were predictors of protective action initiation time.  This is consistent 
with Mileti and Sorensen (1990), and it also indicates consistency with Lindell and Perry (2012) 
in that people delay protective action until the threat is immediate.  Warning receipt time is 
significant for both evacuating and the protective action initiation time in Population A.  This is 
important for dam owners and operators, as well as warning officials, to know as a delay in 
issuing warning results in a delay in receiving warning, which then will delay evacuation even in 
a slow developing dam incident.   
6.2 Time Phased Protective Action Decision Making Model 
The Protective Action Decision Model does not attempt to associate time or time estimates within 
the model, yet each of the sub-components of the information flow overlap the contributing 
factors of the Time Phased Model of Warning and Evacuation.  This study begins to bring 
together the PADM and Time Phased Model of Warning and Evacuation. Figure 4 conceptually 
links the communication flow of the PADM with the time frames presented in the Time Phased 
Model of Warning and Evacuation.   
The characteristics of the evacuation notice receiver were tested for their impacts on warning 
diffusion, protective action initiation, and protective action initiation time.  Income predicted 
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warning receipt time and protective action initiation time in Population B. Income predicted 
evacuation in Population A and race predicted evacuation in Population B.  This suggests that 
personal characteristics may be related to warning diffusion time and protective action initiation 
time, but like past studies, the relationship varies and is inconsistent.   
The psychological processes of the PADM were separated in order to better represent the 
timeframes in which the processes take place.  The pre-decisional processes are aligned with the 
warning diffusion time, the core perceptions and information strategy, and searching with 
protective action initiation delay time.  Pre-decisional processes will impact whether and when a 
warning message is received, thereby initiating the remainder of the decision-making process.  
Delays in receiving warning are reflected in the warning diffusion time.   
Delays in taking protective action are influenced by core perceptions, information searching, 
decision-making, and situational facilitators and impediments.  Core perceptions were measured 
by the warning response process of understanding, risk belief, risk perception, and decision-
making in this study, including whether they varied by distance in Population A or Population B.   
The results were mixed, but perhaps a function of the distance data available.  Mean risk belief 
was higher in the population living nearer to the dam in Population A, suggesting risk belief 
varies by distance.  Examination of the correlations between believability of the first evacuation 
message (message belief), understanding, risk belief, risk perception, and decision-making 
showed a strong positive correlation between risk belief and risk perception in Population A.  
Risk belief and decision-making predicted evacuation in Population A, and message believability 
and decision-making predicted evacuation in Population B.  Message believability also predicted 
protective action initiation time in Population B.  Taken together, this suggests that core 
perceptions do influence protective action initiation and protective action initiation time.   
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Information searching and the information strategy were combined, because the behavior 
response of seeking information and the psychological process of the information strategy likely 
delay protective action initiation time.  Both Population A and Population B reported seeking 
information via a cell phone call and through personal interaction with a friend, relative, 
neighbor, or coworker.  In addition, both populations took time to prepare to evacuate by packing 
items to take with them and securing their homes.  
Warning receipt time predicted protective action initiation time in Population A and Population 
B, which suggests that issuing warning and the pre-decisional processes have a significant impact 
on when people evacuate.  Message believability also predicted protective action initiation time in 
Population B.  Risk belief, risk perception, and decision-making predicted evacuation in 
Population A, and message believability and decision-making predicted evacuation in Population 
B.  This suggests that core perceptions and information searching may not delay evacuation, but 
the decision to evacuate is influenced by at least some aspects of core perception processes and 
information searching.  
Like all conceptual models, this one comes with its limitations.  The process by which people 
decide to take protective action is not linear and does not use all aspects of the PADM.  In 
addition, not all warning comes from an official source, lending the hazard detection and warning 
issuance delay time to overlapping iterations with warning diffusion.  Model adjustments may be 
necessary to account for the speed of onset of a hazard and for low probability, high consequence 
events that may not fit the model as conceptualized. 
6.3 Practical Implications and Recommendations 
There are many practical implications of this research for emergency managers, infrastructure 
owners, and federal government decision making.  This is one of the few studies that evaluates 
research questions and hypotheses for protective action decision making for a dam incident, 
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including the delays in protective action initiation.  In addition, it is one of the only studies on 
protective action decision making utilizing empirical data from a dam incident, and one of the 
only studies that uses distance in the decision-making process and timing of evacuation analysis.  
This study also offers an opportunity to demonstrate what people do between warning and 
evacuation.  The study also provides insight into how people processed the warning message, and 
in turn understood, believed, perceived, and decided what to do about the risks.  This portion of 
the psychological process provides insight to whether and how urgently people initiated 
protective action.  Improved understanding of household decision making allows infrastructure 
owner and operators, emergency managers, and other government officials responsible for 
evacuations to better understand evacuation behaviors, advance predictive modeling during risk 
assessments, and plan for the time necessary to initiate evacuation.   
Federal government agencies utilize predictive life loss models that incorporate anticipated 
human behavior to inform decisions on characterizing, reducing, and managing risks associated 
with dams and for flood risk in general.  The modeling is used to characterize the risks posed by 
infrastructure should anything go wrong with the facility, to make multi-million-dollar decisions 
to reduce risks, and to manage the remaining risk.  The decisions include whether dams meet 
federal tolerable risk guidelines, what risk remains once dams and other infrastructure are in 
place, and whether to build (or not) infrastructure at all.  Improving the accuracy of the modeling, 
as well as identifying factors that may not be currently accounted for in the modeling, allows for a 
more informed risk characterization, risk reduction recommendation, and emergency planning.   
The federal government, however, cannot prevent all life loss through improvements to 
infrastructure performance; therefore, an improved understanding of human behavior also 
facilitates a shared responsibility between the government and those who benefit from the 
infrastructure.  The improved understanding can be used to advise emergency managers and 
government officials, as well as the population living in at-risk areas.  Improved understanding of 
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human behavior in response to risk information is also used to inform emergency action plans 
that indicate who to notify when an infrastructure problem is detected and evacuation planning.  
Given the uncertainty of when a flood fight, including intervention in a dam incident, will 
become a hazard, early warning with clear messaging can save people’s lives.   
The results of this study can also help demonstrate the value of issuing timely warning messages, 
which was shown to impact protective action initiation time.  Understanding what people do 
between receiving an evacuation message and taking protective action can help emergency 
managers and warning officials identify ways to encourage at risk population preparedness, 
including producing information in the channels and sources most utilized by people.  It also 
gives a more realistic expectation of what people will do once warning is issued, rather than 
assuming people will immediately begin evacuating when the risk is not imminent.  The study 
also provides insight into how people processed the warning message, and in turn understood, 
believed, perceived, and decided what to do about the risks.  Finally, emergency managers can 
utilize the information to encourage awareness of infrastructure and its benefits and risks so when 
protective action becomes necessary, the infrastructure and its role are not a surprise to people at 
risk. 
6.4 Study Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
This study, like all studies of human behavior, has its limitations.  The data for the study were 
collected nine months after the Oroville Dam incident.  This impacted the quality of some of the 
data in the study.  For example, respondents identified evacuation days and times that occurred 
prior to the official warning at rates higher than likely would have occurred if the data were 
collected closer to the Oroville Dam incident.  In addition, the Population A sample was hard to 
identify due to the warning telling low lying areas to evacuate, and sampling the whole county 
likely lead to over-representation of people not at risk (J. H. Sorensen & Mileti, 2018).  The 
samples of Population A and Population B could not be combined due to different sampling 
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methodologies for each population, and the dataset lacked geocoded locations, both of which 
limited analysis of distance to dichotomous near/far.  A continuous measure of distance may have 
produced more significant results.  This study did not have access to the warning issuance delay 
data, which could have improved the understanding of the events leading up to the warning 
issuance and Time Phased Protective Action Decision Model.  Future research should include the 
impact of distance on protective action decision making, collect and analyze additional receiver 
characteristic variables related to each step of the protective action decision making process, and 
seek to understanding the warning issuance process.   
The Time Phased Protective Action Decision Making Model needs further refinement and testing, 
including any delays in detecting a hazard and its impact on warning issuance and protective 
action decision-making.  The time it takes to move from hazard detection to protective action 
completion also needs additional study.  The impact of the hazard characteristics on decision-
making and protective action initiation timing also would improve understanding of protective 
action decision making.  The results of the Oroville Dam incident may not materialize in other 
events due to the long duration onset, heightened awareness, and near miss nature of the Oroville 
Dam incident.  Research should continue to seek ways to predict and understand warning 
diffusion, protective action initiation delay, and protective action initiation for more urban areas, 
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